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GM Scientists and the Politics of the Risk Society 
 
Peter T. Robbins, Elisa Pieri and Guy Cook 
 
1. Introduction 
  
Expert knowledge is centrally important in modern industrialised 
societies. Nowhere is this more evident than in science and technology. 
The technological products of modernity have produced innumerable 
benefits as well as unforeseen risks. People are living longer, healthier 
lives, but there is also a pervasive sense of threat. In the United Kingdom, 
this dynamic is apparent in food safety. Since the 1980s, there have been a 
number of ‘food scares’ including those linked to salmonella, listeria, E 
Coli, and ‘mad cow disease’. In recent years, anxiety has centred on 
genetically modified (GM) foods and crops.1 Government responses have 
generally focused on food quality, safety and hygiene2 with the expressed 
aim of restoring public confidence.3 Studies have suggested, however, that 
in the wake of the ‘mad cow’ and other crises, publics4 are increasingly 
unconvinced by such governmental assurances.5 Moreover, with GM 
technology, the increasingly heated debate over food has addressed 
scientific concerns with safety and calculation of risk, in light of 
contextual issues including ethics, politics, and economic power. 
Correspondingly, the language and rhetoric of the debate has increasingly 
drawn upon styles and techniques beyond those of the factual report and 
evaluation of evidence. 
 At least three relevant perspectives have emerged in the 
continuing public debate: (1) Government officials and GM scientists 
argue that GM crop technology is based on ‘sound science’ and 
consequently safe for both human health and the environment.  
(2) Environmental pressure groups and some members of the public 
contest these scientific judgements, raise ethical concerns about the 
relation between human activity and nature, and express political concerns 
about commercially-motivated research and government decision making. 
And (3) meanwhile, the media characterise both scientific reassurances 
and public anxiety in extreme terms. 
 
2. The Great GM Food Debate 
  
In early 1999, a period of intense media interest in GM took 
place, which came to be known as ‘The Great GM Food Debate’. It was 
sparked by a letter in The Guardian signed by 22 scientists in support of 
Arpad Pusztai, a researcher who had found that rats developed cell 
damage in their stomachs, immune system defects and stunted growth 
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after having eaten GM potatoes for a time period corresponding to ten 
years of human life.6 In February, The Guardian ran a series entitled 
“What’s Wrong with our Food?” and phrases such as “Frankenstein 
Foods” and “Mutant Crops” became commonplace in describing GM food 
products.7 Some of the factors contributing to the heated nature of the 
exchanges included: 
  
• the erosion of public confidence in the British food 
industry following the crisis over ‘mad cow disease’ 
in 1996,  
• the importation of unsegregated soya and maize in 
1999, and  
• the establishment of a coalition of GM critics 
including Friends of the Earth, the Soil Association, 
the Vegetarian Society, and public figures such as 
the Prince of Wales.8 
 
The debate remained in the news in subsequent years following a 
successful campaign spearheaded by the group Five Year Freeze 
advocating a moratorium on commercialisation of GM crops and further 
safety testing. 
  
3. University GM Crop Scientists  
 
It was in the context of the ongoing dispute over GM technology 
that we set out to investigate the debate within one representative social 
institution: the university. The project aimed to uncover how GM crop 
scientists at a British university9 presented their research to non-
specialists, and how their linguistic and rhetorical choice varied with the 
purpose of the communication and with their perceptions of audience 
knowledge and views, and how these choices persuaded or antagonised 
receivers. The research took place between November 2001 and 
November 2002. In it, we completed nineteen in-depth interviews with 
scientists, thirteen with non-experts, and seven with outside commentators. 
 The study relates ways of conceptualising risk to the different 
strategies used to represent it. Risk analysis in the social sciences has long 
viewed risk perception as a subjective and social process.10 It argues that 
risks are socially constructed; their collective meanings are shaped by the 
various storylines disseminated by competing institutional actors,11 and 
food scares have been specifically invoked as examples of this process.12 
People’s responses to the risk statements of scientists and government 
officials are seen as reflexive and embedded in social practices, for 
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example lifestyle choices that preclude eating certain types of food.13 This 
highlights the difference between scientific calculations of risk in 
objective terms as probabilities, and actual human perception of risk as a 
factor in daily life.  
 
4. Framework and Methodology 
 
The research strategy combined a sociological approach to the 
content and context of the scientific arguments, with a discourse and 
linguistic analysis of the wording. On the sociological side, the method 
employed provides for the examination of discourse using frame 
analysis.14 This combines an analysis of the semantics of texts with an 
analysis of the contextual factors, such as the discursive strategies of 
scientists. The duality of this type of discourse analysis allows the research 
to relate oral and textual representation of social reality to the social 
processes generating them.15 This is enhanced by the use of rhetorical 
analysis, which has a long tradition of examining persuasion in scientific 
discourses, including specialist and non-specialist genres.16 The transcripts 
of interviews were analysed using a version of the constant comparative 
method.17 In this approach, coding paradigms developed before data 
collection begins are enhanced or rejected through a process of comparing 
analytical ‘dimensions’ that emerge through the process of integrated data 
collection and analysis. This forms the basis for the outcome of the 
research, which is an empirically grounded theory.18 
 On the linguistics side, the project draws upon three approaches, 
applied linguistics discourse analysis,19 critical discourse analysis,20 and 
corpus analysis of texts.21 The central tenet of applied linguistics discourse 
analysis and critical discourse analysis is that the coherence and meaning 
of a text cannot be analysed or accounted for separately from the 
situational and cultural context of its production and reading and its 
paralinguistic features. Our aim was, in using techniques developed in 
corpus analysis of text, to relate linguistic choices in our data to these 
factors. These linguistic based approaches, therefore, fit well with, and 
indeed already make use of, the sociological methodology outlined above. 
From critical discourse analysis, we borrowed techniques for relating 
textual choice to overt ideology, using our sociological data to assess the 
effects of such choices. 
 
5. The Politics of the Risk Society 
  
Ulrich Beck’s theory of the risk society informs our analysis of 
the ways in which GM as a controversial technology comes to be 
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contested by experts and non-experts in the public sphere. Beck’s thesis is 
that life in western, industrialised societies has taken a radical shift since 
the 1980s, which has profoundly altered the ways in which people relate to 
one another. The shift is the constant threat of environmental catastrophes 
and health problems that ironically arise out of technological progress, 
such as global warming, the thinning of the ozone layer and genetically 
modified foods.22  
 An important feature of the risk society is the way in which the 
past monopoly of the sciences on rationality has been broken. 
Paradoxically, science becomes “more and more necessary, but at the 
same time less and less sufficient for the socially binding definition of 
truth”.23 Beck contrasts the rigid “scientific rationality”, which is rooted in 
a critique of backwardness with a new “social rationality”, which is rooted 
in a critique of progress. Under pressure from an increasingly edgy public, 
new forms of “alternative” and “advocacy” science come into being and 
force an internal critique. This “scientisation of protest against science” 
produces a fresh variety of new public oriented scientific experts who 
pioneer new fields of activity and application, such as conservation 
biology.24 
 In similar fashion, monopolies on political action are said to be 
coming apart, thus opening up political decision-making to the process of 
collective action. One example of this is the entry of the Greens into 
parliamentary politics in Germany in the late 1980s. The dynamic of 
reflexive modernization leads to greater individualisation. Unbound from 
the structures of traditional, pre-modern societies, the new urban citizens 
of the industrial revolution were supposed to reach new levels of creativity 
and self-actualisation. However, this did not happen, largely because a 
new constraint, the culture of scientism, invaded every part of the lives of 
its citizens, from risk construction to sexual behaviour. Now, Beck argues, 
there is a chance for the individual to break free once again and choose 
lifestyles, subcultures, social ties and identities. Yet, ironically, just as this 
individualised private existence finally becomes possible, people are 
confronted with risk conflicts, which by their origin and design resist 
individual treatment.25 Examples of this are the genetic manipulation of 
plants and animals, the greenhouse effect and the thinning of the ozone 
layer. Thus, “reflexive scientisation” in which scientific decision-making, 
especially that related to risk, is opened up to social rationality becomes 
important to reclaim individual autonomy. According to Beck,  
 
Only when medicine opposes medicine, nuclear physics 
opposes nuclear physics, human genetics opposes 
human genetics, or information technology opposes 
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information technology can the future that is being 
brewed up in the test-tube become intelligible and 
evaluable for the outside world. Enabling self-criticism 
in all its forms is not some sort of danger but probably 
the only way that the mistakes that would sooner or later 
destroy our world be detected in advance.26 
 
 As Lidskog points out in his review of Risk Society,27 Beck 
contradicts himself by arguing that the planet is in increasing peril due to 
an escalation of objectively certifiable global risks, and at the same time, 
insisting that risks are entirely socially constructed and therefore do not 
exist beyond our perception of them. This reflects a longstanding tension 
in environmental sociology between the environmental activist and the 
sociological analyst.28 Beck also tends to overemphasise the need for 
alternative forms of scientific knowledge, however we agree that on its 
own, science is an insecure base upon which to explain how risks can be 
understood and confronted.29 In this analysis, the main points we draw 
from Beck are the conflicts that occur when scientific rationality is opened 
up to social rationality, and the ways in which this has the potential to 
engender new forms of democratic decision making. 
 
6.  Corporate Drivers and Biotechnology  
 
 An additional factor to consider, which Beck does not examine in 
any great detail, is the role that commercial drivers play in mediating and 
contesting biotechnological risks.30 Of the six major companies that now 
dominate the biotechnology sector, three are United States (US) owned: 
Monsanto, DuPont and Dow, and three are European: Bayer, BASF 
(German) and Syngenta (Swiss). These companies specialise either 
entirely in agricultural biotechnology, pesticides and seeds (Monsanto and 
Syngenta), or have developed specialist businesses to cover these areas 
(Dow AgroSciences, DuPont Agriculture and Nutrition, BASF Plant 
Science, Bayer Crop Science). Monsanto is the world leader in GM crop 
sales. In 1998, it had 88 per cent of the total market. The companies have 
varied histories, DuPont, Dow, BASF and Bayer are traditional, well 
established chemical companies, with long involvement in agrochemicals, 
while Monsanto had focused on discovery of herbicides, but became a 
leader in GM technology and grew by acquisitions. There has been a 
concentration of power in US agriculture concomitant with the 
introduction of GM. In the first five years that GM was commercially 
available, during the mid to late 1990s, suppliers of inputs, and numbers of 
seed companies went from over 400 to just five major players.31  
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 In the United States, more than 70 per cent of processed food 
contains genetically modified ingredients. Around 80 per cent of soy and 
one-third of maize became GM within five years of commercialisation. In 
an average US supermarket, 2000 products contain maize and soy, thus 
most of these contain GM ingredients.32  
 In the United Kingdom, the biotechnology sector has been in 
decline for the last twenty years. Since 1980, the number of research and 
development posts in the agrochemical and biotechnology sector has 
decreased by over sixty per cent. The largest annual decrease was between 
1999 and 2000, in the period following the Great GM Food Debate. No 
agrochemical company has its headquarters in the United Kingdom (UK), 
and there is only one major commercial centre, Syngenta in Berkshire. 
There has been a moratorium on commercial production of GM crops in 
the United Kingdom since 1999.33 A national debate was held between 
June 2002 and July 2003 to aid the UK government in making a decision 
on commercialisation. The debate was comprised of three strands, a 
scientific review, an economic review and a public consultation. In early 
2003, the UK Government decided to process nineteen applications for 
growing and importing GM crops and forward them to relevant member 
states and eventually the European Commission for authorisation. Critics 
claimed this action effectively by-passed the national debate. Margaret 
Beckett, the Environment Secretary asserted that many of the applications 
were “not new” and “already in the pipeline”.34 Sue Mayer of Genewatch 
UK argued “It is premature not to say outrageous, to carry on the licensing 
of GM crops before either the scientific evidence has been gathered or the 
public consulted. It makes the whole exercise seem pointless”. Other 
members of the steering committee of the debate echoed this sentiment.35 
The government response was that it had not taken any decision about 
commercialisation, and that in any event, it would not know whether the 
applications that were submitted were successful until after the public 
debate had concluded. This may suggest that the government was 
confident that the conclusions from the debate would advocate 
commercialisation.  
 
7. Public Understanding of Science 
  
Many scientists believe that public concerns over GM food could 
be addressed if scientists engaged more directly with laypeople, such as 
through a national debate. Within the last fifteen years, scientists in the US 
and UK have been required by funding bodies to deal with non-expert 
members of the public. Scientists in the recent past had looked at the 
popularisation of science as something that could damage their career, 
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which is consistent with a culture that sees the hallmark of good science as 
that which is unintelligible to all but a small group of elites.  
 Underpinning much of the public understanding of science 
movement is the idea that greater public knowledge of science will lead to 
greater public support of the scientific endeavour as well as scientific and 
technological achievements. A corollary of this view is the ‘deficit model’ 
of the public understanding of science, which sees the public as blank 
slates or empty vessels, laypeople whose minds are in need of scientific 
information to be replete.36 For example, EuroBarometer reports, which 
are based on the deficit model, define knowledge purely in terms of GM 
technicalities, and correlate lack of knowledge with negative attitudes to 
GMOs.37 Other research suggests, however, that greater knowledge does 
not necessarily lead to greater acceptance of controversial technologies. 
The 1996 British Social Attitudes Survey found that, while knowledge of 
science had increased significantly since 1988, overall attitudes toward 
science had hardly changed at all.  
 There is some evidence that people who are more knowledgeable 
about science do have more positive attitudes towards it. However, there is 
also much empirical support for the view that greater understanding of 
technologies and their social implications can lead to criticism and 
hostility. This has been the case with nuclear energy and its associations 
with planned or accidental mass destruction, as well as new advances in 
fertility and their ethical implications. It has also been the case with 
genetic modification. Notably, Bucchi and Neresini38 found that increased 
knowledge of techniques did not bring about acceptance of genetically 
modified organisms. Environmentalists often make use of science and are 
in conflict with the scientific establishment, which is commensurate with 
Beck’s observations about the “scientisation of protest against science”. 
According to the deficit model, the scientific community is the 
source − and by and large the censor − of the information that is 
transmitted in a one-way stream to the public. The contextual approach on 
the other hand tries to take into account the particular circumstances of the 
recipients, as well as the purveyors, of the scientific information. 
 Our research suggests that GM scientists view lay members of 
the public through the lens of the deficit model, while members of the 
public take a more contextual approach. In the former view, scientific 
information is seen as distinct from politics, economics, history, and 
ethics. In the latter, scientists’ statements are cross checked against issues 
such as the safety history of the British food industry, people who will 
benefit from GM food technology, and those who are funding the 
science.39 Taken together, they become an example of the struggle Beck 
identified between scientific and social rationality. 
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8.  Scientists Frame Publics 
 
We found that many of the GM scientists interviewed framed 
non-experts, normally referred to as “the public”, in four ways, as 
ignorant, irrational, gullible and intellectually vacuous.40 While all 
scientists did not hold these views, they were certainly the main ways in 
which non-experts were portrayed. We argue that this is significant for 
understanding the wider GM debate, since the framings allow scientists to 
resist lay participation in debates and decision-making on science and 
technology, and to propound the view that GM can only be viewed 
through the scientific perspective.  
 Scientists frequently characterise the public as uniformly 
ignorant, of GM science rather than other relevant dimensions of the 
debate, and attribute opposition to GM to this ignorance. Their views 
suggest that further scientific education would mollify or eradicate 
opposition to GM:  
 
“There are relatively few people that are absolutely 
against [GM], no matter what. Those that are tend to be 
less well informed, in general, than those that have taken 
a more measured view.” (Paul)  
 
 A key theme that emerges in scientists’ narratives of the public is 
a dichotomy that opposes rational scientific knowledge with emotional 
public responses. This division is articulated using words and phrases such 
as “blind”, “blindly”, “religiously hostile”, “real risks (versus) phantoms”, 
“gut feelings”, “inchoate feeling of something wrong”. Decisions about 
the introduction of GM technology are perceived as almost entirely safety 
oriented, based on a rational choice model.41 In other words, if people 
have enough information, they can make a ‘rational choice’ for GM. There 
is an almost exclusive focus on a cost benefit analysis based on assessable 
safety issues relating to health and the environment. There is no reference 
to unforeseen risks, bounded rationality and the need to make the best 
judgement in situations of imperfect knowledge,42 although this has 
recently featured prominently in expressions of doubt about GM 
technology.43  
 
“So the more that you know, and the more information 
you have in particular areas, then the more rational and 
more quantifiable the risk becomes…so that people 
become more able to be rational in the areas that they 
are worried about, and become more relaxed in the areas 
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that are really, frankly, nothing to worry about.” (Paul) 
 
 The view that laypeople are intellectually weak is suggested by 
discussions of whether they can handle the complexity of the issues at 
stake. 
 
 “You can talk in general terms about it and about the 
ethical implications and about whether…for instance a 
particular GM crop will be useful in terms of food 
production on a world scale. Those kinds of things you 
can perfectly talk to people about at length. They’re 
perfectly capable of contributing usefully to that. But I 
think issues for instance about gene flow out of 
transgenic crops into the environment, I mean that’s… 
quite…complicated.” (John)  
 
 Scientists’ view that non-experts are intellectually weak is often 
parodied in anecdotes relating a farcical encounter with a particularly 
uninformed member of the public:  
 
“I had a lady from a magazine ring me up about genetic 
manipulation and [she] said their readers were worried 
about this fact that they were eating DNA, and I said 
‘Well look, you know, OK, but we’re eating DNA all 
the time you know’. [And she said] ‘Are we? Really? 
We’re eating DNA?’ And, I mean – I can understand – 
I’m not criticising her at all or belittling her, but she had 
no idea that everything was full of DNA.” (Simon) 
 
 Scientists also discredit non-experts’ sources of information, and 
claim that people derive their opinions on GM from tabloid newspapers 
and other “sensationalist” press. The representation of members of the 
public as intellectually weak is reinforced through the idea that they are 
gullible and vulnerable to scaremongering by the press and NGOs: 
 
“A lot of this has been driven by the green pressure 
groups and I think they have been playing on fears of the 
unknown. I think that a lot of the rather sensationalist 
press has got a lot to do with the very anti feelings about 
GM in this country at the moment, because scare stories 
sell papers, good news doesn’t.” (Brian)  
 Discrediting publics in these ways makes it possible for many 
GM Scientists and the Politics of the Risk Society 
 
 
94
 
GM scientists to ignore their concerns, or to engage with them only in a 
one-way process of information transfer. It also allows scientists to 
characterise those lacking in scientific knowledge, or who have doubts that 
surpass scientistic constructs, as inappropriate participants in decision-
making processes about the technology.  
 
9. Lay Publics and Agency 
  
Many laypeople also feel a lack of agency, sensing that decisions 
about the technology have already been made and are beyond their 
control. Their views about the GM debate, again not universal, but 
dominant in our dataset, are focused upon actors in the debate and their 
trustworthiness, which is linked with the specific information they purvey. 
Assurances of safety, or cautions about danger, are cross checked against 
knowledge of those who fund the scientific research, and those who 
champion the scientific findings. Public views constellate around key 
institutional players, including the government, corporations, and NGOs.  
 Regarding trust, several themes emerged. Non-experts felt that an 
impartial group was needed to mediate between dominant institutions, 
scientists and the public. Driven by the memory of past food crises, 
government and corporations were seen as untrustworthy as well as biased 
sources of information about GM. This sense of mistrust was not always 
reduced by legislative controls:  
 
“Maybe the Government or somebody could give out 
booklets on what GM food actually is. But they 
probably can’t do that…But yea, just – maybe not the 
Government – somebody – a completely non-biased 
group… [Interviewer: ‘Does the assurance that work is 
conducted in accordance with the relevant legislation 
make you feel safe?’] No, not at all. Because, I’ve sort 
of been brought up not to trust the Government…and 
you imagine it’s just…Tony Blair and the Americans… 
making the legislation.” (Mick)  
 
“I think it’s very difficult if you’ve got businesses 
sponsoring research that deliberately aim to get a 
specific result out of that research. I think there are some 
ethical issues about big companies like Monsanto, or 
whatever, sponsoring research on genetically modified 
foods…and…from a personal point of view, if I was to 
look at any research, I would always find out who paid 
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for it.” (Rachel) 
 
 Some believed that research funded by corporations and 
disseminated by them was acceptable, as long as it was clear who was 
providing the information, so that they could be held accountable:  
 
“I personally would rather [information] come from the 
company. If, touch wood, something does go wrong − 
you hope it doesn’t go wrong − you can fall back and 
you can say ‘right, if so and so said that a food blah, 
blah, blah.’ At least you can go to the company, and if 
you have to go down the lines of going to court, you can 
go down there and take them to court.” (Tom)  
 
 Laypeople’s perceptions were that an independent authority, 
outside politico-economic interests, was needed to make GM safety 
assurances. NGOs were seen as having the potential to fill that role 
because the need for profit did not influence them as much: 
 
“I suspect it comes down to providing understandable 
science tests that are done in this immaculate vision of 
an environment where no damage can be done. I think 
having the Monsantos of this world beating the drum is 
total backfire land. You need to find that independent 
and believable authority − and it’s not our Government 
either. It may be Friends of the Earth or some 
organisation that’s different … So your method of 
testing and your science has got to be totally clear and 
transparent and above board and your arbiters and testers 
have got to be totally believable.” (Ian) 
 
 “With NGOs, I imagine that the big ones have PR 
people working for them. But again, there aren’t quite 
the same commercial concerns there, so that I would 
expect them to put out the information in a clear way. I 
would expect it not to have been spun for commercial 
gain.” (Elizabeth) 
 
 The non-experts were not necessarily anti-GM, but most 
expressed concerns that the process by which GM was entering the food 
chain in the UK was already a fait accompli, and essentially undemocratic: 
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“So I can see [GM] coming. I just would be desperate 
that it happens in a way that we all understand what 
we’re doing, and are at ease with what’s going on, and 
welcome it – rather than have it forced on us.” (Ian) 
 
 What is clear from views of non-experts is that there is a sense of 
the failure of the political process to address adequately and transparently 
all of the contextual factors surrounding GM, and which inform the 
scientific question of whether it is safe. Among the scientists interviewed, 
there is a vague awareness that there are ethical and social objections to 
GM technology, but these are often portrayed as being religious or 
irrational in nature.44 In private or in informal conversation, some 
scientists acknowledged other dimensions to the technology, but expressed 
an inability to address these within the realms of science. Those who say 
they can be addressed, if obliquely, through studies of GM safety, for 
example, are well aware that there are limited resources to pursue this kind 
of research. 
 
10.  Ways Forward: Democratising Science and Technology 
  
Contextual factors relating to new technologies in society do not 
have to be left to experts; they can be addressed through a deliberative 
democratic process that draws legitimacy from free and open debate 
within the public sphere.45 There are a number of possible ways forward. 
Many have called on governments to re-examine decision making on 
controversial technology, and consider whether there should be “a broad 
cultural change about relationships between technology and society”. This 
would build democratic participation based upon a relationship between 
experts and non-experts, rather than an approach rooted in the top down 
transmission of information.46  
 There is a wide range of examples where relationships between 
science, technology and society have been successfully democratised. 
Citizens’ juries of laypeople have been used fruitfully in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts to make decisions about new gene splicing laboratories at 
Harvard University. The Danish Board of Technology’s consensus 
conferences are driven by interested lay citizens making use of scientific 
evidence to compile a final report, which is then cross-checked by expert 
panels.47 Similarly, the GM public debate in Britain in 2002-2003 was a 
first step toward democratising the lay/expert divide, but the way it 
unfolded suggests there is still much work to be done.  
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11. Conclusion 
  
The GM debate is a paradigmatic example of the struggles 
between scientific and social rationality that occur in societies defined by 
risk. Trust in institutions that traditionally ensured safety has deteriorated, 
and there is the sense that democratic decision making occurs only in 
name. Those who hold power, government officials, scientists and corpor-
ate executives, portray themselves as embattled and under siege. Powerful 
actors often set the rules, directly and indirectly, by which others partici-
pate. At the same time, there is a contest over meaning that occurs within 
the public sphere between those for and against that provides tremendous 
prospects for democratic decision making. New science and technologies 
offer vast opportunities to high modern societies, and to a certain extent 
define them. The answer is not to return to an idyllic past or retreat into 
Ludditism. Nor is it possible to leave important decisions to ‘experts’. The 
solution is to transform participatory politics, and to encourage new ways 
of debating, contesting, and shaping our common future.  
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